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SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Domestic Law
I. COURT FINDS MOTHER MAY NOT PREVENT FATHER
FROM ASSERTING PARENTAL RIGHTS
In Abernathy v. Baby Boy' the Supreme Court of South Carolina declared
that section 20-7-1690(A)(5)(b) of the Children's Code requires a natural
father's consent to the adoption of his child born out of wedlock where the
father has made "sufficient prompt and good faith efforts to assume parental
responsibility and to comply with the statute." 3 Therefore, the natural mother
may not deny the father his right to withhold consent and block the adoption
simply by refusing to accept his offer to pay either financial support for the
child or the expenses associated with the pregnancy or birth. However, the
timeliness of the father's efforts and the surrounding circumstances may limit
his right to block the adoption.4
Mitchell Calvert and Julie Ayers had a casual sexual relationship while in
the Navy. Ayers became pregnant and informed Calvert that he was the
father. Calvert offered to support the child but had orders for sea duty; Ayers
told him that they would discuss support when he returned. Before leaving for
duty, Calvert gave Ayers access to his bank account and his car. He also
offered to send Ayers to college and to stay home to care for their child if she
agreed to work part-time.'
However, Ayers ended the relationship while Calvert was at sea. She put
Calvert's car in storage and spent only a small amount of his money, allegedly
1. __ S.C. __, 437 S.E.2d 25 (1993).
2. For the purpose of adoption this section requires consent or relinquishment from:
the father of a child born when the father was not married to the child's mother, if
the child was placed with the prospective adoptive parents six months or less after the
child's birth, but only if:
(a) the father openly lived with the child or the child's mother for a continuous period
of six months immediately preceding the placement of the child for adoption, and the
father openly held himself out to be the father of the child during the six months
period; or
(b) the father paid a fair and reasonable sum, based on the father's financial ability,
for the support of the child or for expenses incurred in connection with the mother's
pregnancy or with the birth of the child, including, but not limited to, medical,
hospital, and nursing expenses.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1690 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1993).
3. Abernathy, _ S.C. at _, 437 S.E.2d at 29.
4. Id. at __,437 S.E.2d at 29.
5. Id. at __,437 S.E.2d at 27.
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to pay for a speeding ticket Calvert received and for the car's storage. When
Calvert returned, he offered to marry Ayers, but she refused. Thereafter,
Ayers refused to see Calvert and declined his phone calls.6
While still pregnant, Ayers agreed to let the Abernathys adopt the child,
who was born on January 25, 1992. The Abernathys commenced an adoption
action on January 30, and Calvert filed a cross-complaint contesting the
adoption and seeking custody of the child.7 Although Ayers prevented
Calvert's literal compliance with section 20-7-1690(A)(5)(b) by refusing to
accept his financial support, the lower court found that Calvert satisfied the
section's requirements. Calvert could withhold his consent and block the
adoption because he made "diligent and bona fide offers of support ... ."
Accordingly, the adoption failed, and the court awarded Calvert custody.9
The Supreme Court of South Carolina affirmed the judgment.10"In Abernathy the South Carolina Supreme Court reasoned that unwed
fathers possess a constitutionally protected "opportunity interest" in cultivating
a parental relationship with their children. I Additionally, the court explained
that an unwed natural father's parental interest receives substantial protection
when he makes timely, good-faith attempts to develop a relationship with his
child.' 2 The court read these precepts into section 20-7-1690(A)(5)(b) and
declared that a natural father may block his child's adoption not only if he
satisfies the section's literal requirements but also if he seeks to cultivate his
opportunity interest by making prompt, bona fide attempts to comply with the
section's literal requirements. 3
The court first reasoned that while every biological father possesses this
opportunity interest when his child is first born, the Constitution will protect
his interest in having a full, parental relationship only if he "demonstrate[s] a
full commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood. . . ."14 Therefore, the
court continued, "it is only the combination of biology and custodial
responsibility that the Constitution ultimately protects." 15 The court qualified
further the unwed father's parental interest by requiring him to timely develop
his commitment to the child for the interest to deserve substantial protec-
6. Id. at __,437 S.E.2d at 27.
7. Id. at __,437 S.E.2d at 27.
8. Abernathy, _ S.C. at __, 437 S.E.2d at 28. Section 20-7-1690(A)(5)(a) did not apply
because Calvert had not lived with either Ayers or the child for a continuous period of six months
immediately prior to the child's placement for adoption. See Plaintiff's Trial Brief at 3.
9. Abernathy, _ S.C. at __, 437 S.E.2d at 28.
10. Id. at _, 437 S.E.2d at 27.
11. Id. at_, 437 S.E.2d at 28.
12. Id. at __,437 S.E.2d at 28.
13. Id. at __,437 S.E.2d at 29.
14. Abernathy, _ S.C. at __, 437 S.E.2d at 28.
15. Id. at __, 437 S.E.2d at 28 (emphasis added).
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tion. 16 This limitation is necessary because children require "early perma-
nence and stability in parental relationships.'17
The court also based its decision on legislative intent, stating that the
South Carolina legislature enacted the section to establish "general minimum
standards by which an unwed father timely may demonstrate his commitment
to the child, and his desire to 'grasp [the] opportunity' to assume full
[parental] responsibility. ... 18 The court implied that to allow a mother
to obstruct an unwed father's right to develop his opportunity interest, thereby
denying him the right to block his child's adoption, would contravene the
section's purpose. 9 Accordingly, the court stated that section 20-7-1690(a)-
(5)(b) requires an unwed father's consent to his child's adoption not only when
he literally complies with its requirements, but also when he makes timely,
good faith efforts to do so.2"
In Abernathy the South Carolina Supreme Court properly recognized that
an unwed natural father may comply with section 20-7-1690(A)(5)(b) through
timely good faith efforts. The court soundly construed the section. A natural
mother should not have the power to terminate a natural father's right to block
his child's adoption simply by refusing his offers of support. 21 Not only
sensible, the court's analysis comports with South Carolina and United States
Supreme Court decisions on adoption.
First, Abernathy is consistent with South Carolina's basic principles of
adoption law. In Hudson v. Blanton,' the court of appeals stated that
adoption "is in derogation of the common law and, therefore, [must] be
strictly construed in favor of the parent and the preservation of the relationship
of parent and child."' Although Abernathy did not-preserve a parental
16. Id. at __ 437 S.E.2d at 28.
17. Id. at , 437 S.E.2d at 28.
18. Id. at-, 437 S.E.2d at 29 (quoting Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983)) (citations
omitted).
19. See Abernathy, _ S.C. at _, 437 S.E.2d at 29.
20. Id. at __, 437 S.E.2d at 29.
21. Cf. In re Adoption of Baby Girl S, 535 N.Y.S.2d 676, 683 (Sup. Ct. 1988) aff'dsub nom.
In re Baby Girl S., 543 N.Y.S.2d 602 (App. Div. 1989), aff'd sub nom. In re Raquel Marie X.,
559 N.E.2d 418 (N.Y. 1990), cert. denied, 448 U.S. 984 (1990) (holding that "[t]he
constitutional right of the unwed father who has demonstrated responsibility for his child cannot
be made to depend upon a condition outside his control").
Also, the Supreme Court has stated that "the custody, care and nurture of the child reside
first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the
state can neither supply nor hinder." Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978) (quoting
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944)) (emphasis added). Therefore, the court
correctly did not permit § 20-7-1690's literal requirements to hinder the natural father's right to
develop a parental relationship with his child.
22. 282 S.C. 70, 316 S.E.2d 432 (Ct. App. 1984).
23. Id. at 75-76, 316 S.E.2d at 435 (citing Goff v. Benedict, 252 S.C. 83, 165 S.E.2d 269
[Vol. 46
3
Azzariti et al.: Domestic Law
Published by Scholar Commons,
DOMESTIC LAW
relationship, it did favor the natural father and his opportunity to develop such
a relationship with his child.
However, arguably Abernathy contradicts Hudson because the Abernathy
court upheld the dissolution of the Abernathys' relationship with the child,
possibly defeating the child's best interests.2 4 But in affirming the lower
court's denial of an adoption decree, the Hudson court held that "the decree
of adoption must be refused even if the adoption would result in benefits s the
child when one whose parental rights have not been terminated withholds
consent. "I Therefore, the Abernathy court actually demonstrated its
approval of Hudson by indicating that once Calvert made a good faith effort
to cultivate his opportunity interest by offering support his interest in a full,
parental relationship outweighed both the Abernathys' interest in their
relationship with the child and their claims regarding the child's best interests.
Moreover, although in South Carolina, "[tjhe best interest of the child
remains... the paramount consideration in every adoption,"26 Abernathy
correctly suggests that the preservation of the unwed natural father's interest
in developing a parental relationship is presumptively in the child's best
interest.27 This presumption is consistent with Lehr v. Robertson.28 There
the United States Supreme Court recognized a natural father's ability to make
"uniquely valuable contributions to [his] child's development. "29 The court
noted "[t]he significance of the [natural father's] biological connection"3" to
his child and its relationship to his protected opportunity interest.3"
Furthermore, Abernathy also is consistent with South Carolina cases
characterizing a child's abandonment as a forfeiture of parental rights. In
(1969)).
24. The Abemathys contended that the adoption would best serve the child's interests because:
(1) the Abemathys were the only parents that the child had ever known, (2) the child had been
with the Abemathys for more than ten months, and (3) the child thrived under their care.
Plaintiff's Trial Brief at 7.
25. Hudson, 282 S.C. at 76, 316 S.E.2d at 435 (citing Gofi).
26. Dunn v. Dunn, 298 S.C. 365, 367, 380 S.E.2d 836, 837 (1989).
27. Compare this with a United States Supreme Court discussion of the child's best interest
standard:
We have little doubt that the Due Process Clause would be offended "[ilf a State were
to attempt to force the breakup of a natural family, over the objections of the parents
and their children, without some showing of unfitness and for the sole reason that to
do so was thought to be in the children's best interest."
Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 255 (quoting Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality &
Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 862-63 (1977) (Stewart, J., concurring)).
28. 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
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D'Augustine v. Bush,"2 the Supreme Court of South Carolina held that when
a natural mother obviously does not want the natural father to contribute to
their child's support or for him to have a relationship with the child, "the
[natural father's] failure to contribute to the support of the child is of little
weight in establishing abandonment." 3 Abernathy properly extended this
reasoning to section 20-7-1690(A)(5)(b) by refusing to allow a natural mother
to deny a father's right to withhold consent simply by rebuffing his good faith
offers of financial support.34
Additionally, the Abernathy court further coincides with the Supreme
Court's reasoning in Lehr by concluding that an unwed natural father must
timely cultivate his opportunity interest in developing a relationship with his
child. In Abernathy, the court explained that a natural father's "opportunity
interest is of limited duration as a constitutionally significant interest because
of the child's need for early permanence and stability in parental relation-
ships. "3 Therefore, in South Carolina, if an unwed natural father does not
promptly make appropriate, good faith efforts to comply with section 20-7-
1690(A)(5)(b), he may lose his protected opportunity interest in developing a
personal relationship with his child. Thus, he may lose his right to block his
child's adoption.
In Lehr, the Supreme Court reasoned that a putative father lost his
constitutionally protected interest in developing a full, parental relationship
with his child because he "never established any custodial, personal, or
financial relationship with her"36 during the more than two years since her
birth. 37 The Court declared that a natural father is entitled to a full parental
relationship only "[i]f he grasps that opportunity and accepts some measure of
responsibility for the child's future. "38 Moreover, in deciding that the father
had not sufficiently grasped this opportunity, the Court emphasized that he
offered no support and rarely visited the child while the natural mother "had
a continuous custodial responsibility for [the child]."13 Therefore, the natural
father could not block his child's adoption because he had not promptly
attempted to develop his opportunity interest.40
32. 269 S.C. 342, 237 S.E.2d 384 (1977).
33. Id. at 347, 237 S.E.2d at 386. See also In re Kiran Chandini S., 560 N.Y.S.2d 886
(App. Div. 1990) (finding that the natural father had not abandoned his daughter where he had
offered to pay pregnancy and birth expenses but the mother refused; the father retained the right
to veto the adoption).
34. Abernathy, _ S.C. at _, 437 S.E.2d at 29.
35. Id. at _, 437 S.E.2d at 29.
36. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 267.
37. See id. at 249-50 (where the natural mother married the adoptive father eight months after
the child's birth).
38. Id. at 262.
39. Id. at 267.
40. See also In re Baby Girl Eason, 358 S.E.2d 459, 462 (Ga. 1987) (holding that " t]he
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Accordingly, "[t]he main significance of Lehr ... is its indication that [a
father's opportunity interest] in establishing a constitutionally protected parent-
child relationship is of constitutional significance for only a limited time."41
Thus, the Abernathy requirement of promptness coincides with the Supreme
Court's reasoning in Lehr.
The Abernathy court's analysis of the legislative purpose of section 20-7-
1690 also is well-grounded. The court observed that the legislature enacted
the section to establish "general minimum standards by which an unwed father
timely may demonstrate... his desire to 'grasp [the] opportunity' to assume
full responsibility for this child."42 The court also noted that to make the
natural father's right to withhold consent contingent upon the natural mother's
acceptance of his good faith offers would contravene the legislature's intent.43
This analysis is correct because if the court had construed section 20-7-
1690(A)(5)(b) as granting such arbitrary authority to a natural mother, a valid
adoption effectively would require only the mother's consent. An unwed
natural father's ability to block his child's adoption actually would depend
upon whether the mother favored the adoption. If this were the section's
purpose, the legislature would not have included any provision for a natural
father's right to withhold his consent. However, because section 20-7-1690
exists, the legislature apparently intended to grant a natural father the
opportunity to acquire a protected right to block his child's adoption.
In conclusion, the South Carolina Supreme Court's decision in Abernathy
is well-founded. Not only consistent with South Carolina and United States
Supreme Court adoption case law, Abernathy correctly recognizes the apparent
legislative intent of section 20-7-1690. One important aspect of the decision,
and a likely focus of future litigation, is the court's declaration that "[t]ime
and circumstances may limit the protectability of an unwed father's interest in
his child.""
While clearly an unwed natural father must timely act to secure his
parental rights under section 20-7-1690(A)(5)(b), 5 courts should not develop
rigid tests to determine whether a natural father has satisfied the Abernathy
promptness requirement. Rather, timeliness should depend "on the circum-
stances under which the state is acting."46 While the child's age is "relevant
to the issue of timeliness,"' courts also should consider whether, at the time
opportunity interest... can be abandoned by the unwed father if not timely pursued").
41. Elizabeth Buchanan, The Constitutional Rights of Unwed Fathers Before and After Lehr
v. Robertson, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 313, 364 (1984).
42. Abernathy, _ S.C. at __, 437 S.E.2d at 29 (quoting Lehr, 463 U.S. at 262) (citations
omitted).
43. See id. at _, 437 S.E.2d at 29.
44. Id. at _, 437 S.E.2d at 29.
45. See id. at _, 437 S.E.2d at 29.
46. Buchanan, supra note 41, at 364.
47. Id. (discussing Lehr where the child was already more than two years old and Quilloin
19941
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of the adoption, someone already has assumed the natural father's role and
responsibilities, thus offering the child an early, permanent, and stable parental
relationship.4" The existence of such a relationship likely would defeat any
of the natural father's later good-faith efforts if the father's attempts would
disrupt the existing family relationship.49
However, if the child does not yet have a permanent and stable family
relationship,5" courts should not disqualify the natural father's good faith
attempts to comply with section 20-7-1690(A)(5)(b) for lack of timeliness,
regardless of the child's age.5" In this situation, protection of the father's
opportunity interest would not thwart the child's need for early permanence
and stability if the child does not yet have such permanence or stability.52
Rather, this would offer the father a chance to develop such a lasting custodial
relationship with his child.
Michael J. Azzariti
II. COURT DEFERENTIAL To PARENTAL RIGHTS
In Hopkins v. South Carolina Department of Social Services' the South
Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the family court's refusal to terminate a
father's parental rights. In doing so, the court reversed its prior decision in
the same case,2 illustrating a fundamental difference of opinion among court
members.
Randy Meyers had a short-term relationship with Grace Clark in the fall
of 1983. In May 1984 Clark told Meyers she had given birth and denied
Meyers' paternity. Actually Clark gave birth to Michael in July 1984. Over
where the child was already more than 11 years old; when the respective natural fathers tried to
develop parental relationships, in both cases, the Court permitted adoption over the natural
father's objections).
48. See id., at 364 (explainingthat "the decree sought in both of the cases [Lehr and Quilloin]
was adoption by the children's stepfathers with whom the children had lived in de facto parent-
child relationships for a long time").
49. Thus, in Abernathy, if Ayers had kept the child and married someone else and if Calvert
had been at sea long enough for Ayers and her husband to develop a permanent and stable family
relationship with the child, Calvert likely would not have been able to satisfy the promptness
requirement upon his return.
50. Buchanan, supra note 41, at 366 (noting that "when a natural mother formally consents
to the adoption of her child by strangers . . . the effect ... is ... not the validation of an
already existing parent-child relationship").
51. See id. at 364-67.
52. Id.
1. __ S.C. _, 437 S.E.2d 542 (1993).
2. Hopkins v. South Carolina Dep't of Social Servs., No. 23546, 1992 WL 1948 (S.C. Jan.
6, 1992), reh'g granted, Dec. 17, 1992, on reh'g, _ S.C. _, 437 S.E.2d 542 (1993).
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the next several years, Clark equivocated between asserting and denying
Meyers' paternity.3
In November 1987 the South Carolina Department of Social Services
(DSS) found Michael and his half-sister, Amanda, living in deplorable
conditions and took them into emergency protective custody. Although DSS
knew the children were not eligible for adoption, DSS placed the children with
Sollie and Mary Floyd, who were seeking to adopt. DSS did not tell the
Floyds the children were not presently adoptable.4
In February 1988, Meyers immediately contacted DSS when Amanda's
father informed Meyers that Michael was in DSS's custody. Meyers did not
know yet whether Michael was his son, but drove a thousand miles from his
home in Missouri to attend a hearing in July 1988.' Between the hearing and
May 1989, Meyers attempted to establish a relationship with Michael and
Amanda despite DSS's refusal to allow him visitation and despite a long delay
in DSS's informing him of the results of paternity blood tests.6 Finally, DSS
informed Meyers that he was the father, that he must pay $150 per month for
child support, and that he could have limited visitation.7 Meyers failed to
comply with the DSS request for child support.
In 1989 the Floyds and the children's guardian ad litem brought actions
to terminate Meyers' parental rights for failure to visit within six months. The
family court found Meyers had done everything he could to establish a parent-
child bond and refused to terminate Meyers' parental rights. The court
ordered DSS to establish a treatment plan and, if the plan succeeded, to
permanently place Michael with Meyers.' The Floyds appealed the court's
refusal to terminate Meyers' rights on the ground of abandonment. 9
3. Hopkins, _ S.C. at _, 437 S.E.2d at 543.
4. Id. at __,437 S.E.2d at 543.
5. Id. at ,437 S.E.2d at 543.
6. Id. at_, 437 S.E.2d at 543-44. DSS instructed Meyers not to call Michael at the Floyds'
home, informing him that any contact with Michael must come through DSS. These procedures
chilled Meyers' efforts to establish a bond with Michael. See Id. at __, 437 S.E.2d at 543.
DSS received blood tests proving Meyers' paternity by March 17, 1989, but did not provide
Meyers with those results until May 22, 1989. See Hopkins, _ S.C. at _, 437 S.E.2d at
544.
7. DSS permitted Meyers to visit Michael in Florence but only in DSS's presence for 60 to
90 minutes at a time. See Record at 45-54; see also Brief of Respondent at 4. The family court
judge found that Meyers could not pay support to DSS due to the travel, phone, and legal costs
totalling approximately $2,000 incurred in his attempts to gain custody. Hopkins, _ S.C. at
_, 437 S.E.2d at 544; Record at 82.
8. Hopkins, _ S.C. at __, 437 S.E.2d at 544. The family court order provided that DSS
"shall immediately develop a treatment plan promoting bonding between Michael and the Myers
[sic] family during a transition period, with the goal of reuniting Michael with his father, with
all deliberate speed." Record at 91.
9. Hopkins, S.C. at , 437 S.E.2d at 544.
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The South Carolina Supreme Court initially found in favor of terminating
Meyers' parental rights on January 6, 1992.10 However, the court withdrew
that opinion and granted rehearing because the original decision was based on
erroneous information." In May 1989 DSS set Meyers' child support at
$150 per month. 2 On November 22, 1989, the family court found Meyers
could not afford to pay this amount and ordered Meyers to pay twenty dollars
per week. 3 In its opinion issued January 6, 1992, a majority terminated
Meyers' parental rights on the basis of Meyers' willful failure to pay twenty
dollars per week.'4 However, this support order was the very decision from
which the parties appealed. As the respondent stated in his Memorandum in
Support of Petition for Rehearing, "the evidence reveals that [Meyers] paid at
least $160 from November of 1989 to February 26, 1991 ... [and] had paid
support totalling approximately 53 of the 65 weeks of his support obliga-
tion... "' Similarly, the court could not terminate Meyers's parental rights
for failure to comply with DSS's request for support because DSS assessed the
$150 per month on May 22, 1989, less than 6 months before the final
hearing.'
6
However, the real reason for the court's reversal appears to be a change
in the court itself rather than the realization of this error. Indeed, the final
opinion's dissent is not worded much differently from the former majority
opinion.
Justice Toal, Chief Justice Gregory, and Acting Associate Justice
Littlejohn composed the 1992 majority. Justices Finney and Chandler
dissented, and Justice Harwell did not participate." Subsequently, Justice
Moore replaced Justice Gregory who left the court. Justice Moore joined
Acting Chief Justice Chandler and Justice Finney to make a new majority, and
Justice Toal and Acting Associate Justice Littlejohn now dissented.' 8 The
change in votes wrought a significant change in precedent, the majority and
dissent comprising two camps divided by philosophy and legal theory.
10. See Hopkins v. South Carolina Dep't. of Social Servs., No. 23546, 1992 VL 1948 at *1
(S.C. Jan. 6, 1992), reg'h granted, Dec. 17, 1992, on reh'g, _ S.C. __, 437 S.E.2d 542
(1993).
11. See Grant of Petition for Rehearing, Hopkins, No. 23546, 1992 WL 1948 (S.C. Jan. 6,
1992) (No. 89-CP-21-231); Respondent's Petition for Rehearing at 2-3.
12. Hopkins, _ S.C. at _, 437 S.E.2d at 544.
13. Id. at _, 437 S.E.2d at 544; Record at 91.
14. See Hopkins, No. 23546, 1992 WL 1948 at *3.
15. Respondent's Memorandum in Support of Petition for Rehearing at 4 (citations omitted).
16. See id. at 2.
17. See Hopkins, No. 23546, 1992 WL 1948 at *1, *4.
18. See Hopkins, _ S.C. at _, 437 S.E.2d at 543, 545.
[Vol. 46
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The court addressed two issues: (1) whether the family court erred in
refusing to terminate Meyers' parental fights and (2) whether the family court
erred in granting Meyers custody through a treatment plan organized by DSS.
First, the court affirmed the family court's refusal to terminate Meyers's
parental rights.19 The court noted that a court may terminate parental rights
only upon clear and convincing evidence of statutory grounds for termina-
tion.2' The court found that no statutory basis existed for the termination of
Meyers' rights. No clear and convincing evidence showed that Meyers
abandoned Michael by wilfully failing to visit. Instead the evidence showed
that DSS did not permit Meyers to visit until three months after the guardian
ad litem brought an action for termination and two months before the Floyds
fied their termination action.21 Meyers could not have wilfully failed to visit
for six months.
Second, the court held that the family court did not err in granting Meyers
custody if a DSS treatment plan were successful.' The court cited the
presumption of Moore v. Moore'z "that a fit natural parent should have
custody as against a third party."2 When the third party has physical
custody the court considers the following other factors: (1) the circumstances
under which the child came into DSS's custody, (2) the amount of contact the
parent had with the child while the child has been in DSS's custody, and (3)
the extent of the child's attachment to the foster parents.' In this case, the
court found the third factor to be "the sticking point,"26 because neither of
the other factors were Meyers' fault. Meyers was not responsible for the
circumstances under which Michael came into DSS's custody, and any lack of
contact Meyers had with Michael was the product of "unreasonable conditions
imposed by DSS."27
Because of the strong bond between Michael and the Floyds, the court
found that the family court "struck a proper balance by allowing Michael to
continue to reside with the Floyds pending the development of a close
relationship with his father."28 Thus, the court affirmed the family court's
refusal to terminate Meyers' parental rights and its order to establish a plan to
19. See id. at _, 437 S.E.2d at 543.
20. Id. at _, 437 S.E.2d at 544 (citing Abercrombie v. LaBoon, 290 S.C. 35, 348 S.E.2d
170 (1986); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1572 (3) (Law. Co-op. 1985)).
21. Hopkins, _ S.C. at __, 437 S.E.2d at 544.
22. Id. at _, 437 S.E.2d at 545.
23. 300 S.C. 75, 386 S.E.2d 456 (1989).
24. Hopkins, _ S.C. at _, 437 S.E.2d at 544.
25. Id. at __, 437 S.E.2d at 544; see also Moore, 300 S.C. at 79-80, 386 S.E.2d at 458.
26. Hopkins, _ S.C. at _, 437 S.E.2d at 544.
27. Id. at _, 437 S.E.2d at 544.
28. Id. at , 437 S.E.2d at 545.
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reunite Meyers and Michael with Meyers' eventual custody contingent on the
plan's success.29
With respect to termination of parental rights, the majority focused on
whether the family court could have found clear and convincing evidence to
support a statutory ground for termination. Unlike the dissent, the majority
did not discuss section 20-7-1578,o which provides that the statutes should
"be liberally construed in order to ensure prompt judicial procedures for
freeing minor children from the custody and control of their parents by
terminating the parent-child relationship" and that "[tjhe interests of the child
shall prevail if the child's interest and the parental rights conflict."3
The dissent32 disagreed with the majority's failure to terminate Meyers'
parental rights and advocated a more liberal construction of the statutory
grounds for termination. The dissent cited section 20-7-1578 as controlling
how courts should construe termination of parental rights statutes. The dissent
showed no deference to the lower court's determination.33 Further, the
dissent stressed, "In a termination of parental rights action, it is necessary for
the Court to continually look towards a child's best interest."34
In short the dissent espoused construing the statutes to effectuate the
child's best interests, whereas the majority looked first at whether statutory
grounds for termination existed. If no such grounds did exist, the majority
saw no need to weigh parental rights against the child's best interests. 5
The problem with the dissent's reasoning is its failure to construe properly
the statutes providing for termination of parental rights. In finding that
Meyers' parental rights should be terminated pursuant to section 20-7-
1572(4),36 the dissent disagrees with the majority's finding that the facts do
not support a statutory basis for termination. Nor does the dissent refute the
majority's assertion that the issue of Meyers' willful failure to support is not
before the court. 7 Rather, the dissent argues that the court should construe
29. Id. at _, 437 S.E.2d at 545.
30. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1578 (Law. Co-op. 1985).
31. Id.
32. Acting Associate Justice Littlejohn was sitting in for Justice Harwell. Probably the vote
would have been the same had Justice Harwell participated, considering that Justice Harwell
voted with Justice Toal in Greenville County Department of Social Services v. Bowes, _ S.C.
-, 437 S.E.2d 107 (1993), discussed infra.
33. Hopkins, _ S.C. at _, 437 S.E.2d at 548-49 (Toal, J., dissenting).
34. Id. at _, 437 S.E.2d at 549.
35. See Hopkins, No. 23546, 1992 WL 1948 at *5, *9.
36. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1572(4) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1993).
37. As Justice Chandler notes in concurrence:
The legal ground upon which the dissent would terminate Meyers' parental
rights, wilful failure to support, was specifically rejected by the Family Court which
noted that Meyers had not paid support to DSS "due to the travel, phone and legal
costs ... incurred .... Appellants took no exception to this ruling. Further, the
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liberally section 20-7-1572. The dissent notes that in 1992 the legislature
amended the statute to eliminate the requirement of a request for contribution
before a court can find a parent in violation of the section, instead making the
request merely a factor to be considered by the court." This argument is
irrelevant because the majority does not mention the lack of a request.
Instead, the majority properly refuses to consider an issue not before the court.
The dissent would base a finding of failure to support on circumstances
following the order on appeal.
Nowhere does the dissent argue that Meyers willfully failed to support
Michael for six months prior to the family court order. Instead, it argues that
the 1992 amendment "further liberalizes the impact of the statute and is
indicative of the legislature's intent that the best interests of the child should
prevail." 39 While section 20-7-1578 provides that the courts should construe
the statutes in favor of the child's best interests,40 the statute does not
preempt the requirement that grounds exist for termination of parental rights.
The dissent errs in believing that the court can find that the child's best
interests compel termination of rights despite the absence of statutory grounds.
With respect to custody, the majority focuses on the state's public policy
favoring reuniting parents and children. The majority applies the Moore
factors but seems to imply that the existence of, or even the potential for, a
close relationship between a biological parent and a child is a determinative
factor, irrespective of the child's attachment to third parties. Underlying this
application of Moore, the majority appears to make a point to DSS about the
hazards of prematurely placing children with adoptive parents and, in
particular, about its treatment of Meyers in this case.
First, DSS should not have placed Michael with the Floyds knowing they
desired to adopt and knowing that Michael was ineligible for adoption. As the
family court found:
The evidence is overwhelming that the S.C.D.S.S. usurped its authority in
placing the children for the known purpose of adoption by the foster
parents at the time of initial placement with the Floyds, which naturally
caused the Floyds to 'feel threatened' when Mr. Myers [sic] attempted to
establish a relationship with the children and obtain their custody, naturally
tending to create friction between the Floyds and the Myers [sic], and
facts set forth to support the dissenting opinion are irrelevant to that issue and are not
supported by the record.
Hopkins, _ S.C. at_, 437 S.E.2d at 545 (Chandler, Acting C.J., concurring).
38. Id. at __, 437 S.E.2d at 548 (Toal, J., dissenting).
39. Id. at __, 437 S.E.2d at 548 (Toal, J., dissenting).
40. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1578 (Law. Co-op. 1985).
19941
12
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 46, Iss. 1 [], Art. 6
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol46/iss1/6
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
naturally tending to create a situation where the Floyds would not strive
to promote parental bonding between Mr. Myers [sic] and the children.
41
Second, rather than facilitating the creation of a bond between Meyers and
his son, DSS chilled Meyers' attempts to reunite with Michael. The majority
noted that DSS's refusal to allow Meyers visitation pending establishment of
paternity, permitting him only monitored phone contact with Michael during
working hours, and reading and reviewing any correspondence before
delivering it to Michael "chilled Meyers' attempts to bond with [Michael and
Amanda]."" Further, DSS inexcusably delayed revealing the paternity test
results. Although DSS obtained these results by March 17, 1989, DSS refused
to disclose them until Meyers paid a share of the test's costs. Then DSS
informed Meyers that failure to attend a hearing scheduled for April 1989
would be construed as Meyers' consent to termination of his parental rights.
43
In concurrence, Chandler noted, "The delay in this case has been untenable,
but it is attributable not to Meyers, but to the actions of the natural mother,
the foster parents, the Judicial system and, most particularly, the SCDSS."44
On the other hand, the dissent did not blame DSS for the lack of bonding
between Meyers and his son; it blamed Meyers himself. The dissent found
that Meyers's concern for his marriage continually outweighed his concern for
Michael and that "during the period of greatest abuse, the natural father, out
of fear for his marriage, was unwilling to pursue any option to provide
support, or to retrieve the child from a known detrimental situation. "s
Furthermore, the dissent believed that the majority failed to consider
Michael's best interests. Here the dissent may have the better argument. No
clear and convincing evidence standard exists in custody determinations.
Rather, Moore requires a balancing of factors to determine how the child's
best interests can be met when the natural parent seeks custody from a third
party."6 Despite the rebuttable presumption that the child's best interests are
to be in the biological parent's custody, "[t]he best interest of the child is the
primary and controlling consideration of the Court in all child custody
controversies. "'7
41. Record at 88-89.
42. Hopkins, _ S.C. at _, 437 S.E.2d at 543.
43. Id. at 437 S.E.2d at 544.
44. Id. at , 437 S.E.2d at 546 (Chandler, Acting C.J., concurring).
45. Id. at , 437 S.E.2d at 547 (Toal, J., dissenting). In concurrence Justice Chandler
points out that "[t]here is no support in the record for this statement. .. ." Id. at _, 437
S.E.2d at 545 (Chandler, Acting C.J., concurring).
46. See Moore, 300 S.C. at 79-80, 386 S.E.2d at 458.
47. Id. at 78-79, 386 S.E.2d at 458 (citing Peay v. Peay, 260 S.C. 108, 194 S.E.2d 392
(1973); Koon v. Koon, 203 S.C. 556, 28 S.E.2d 89 (1943)).
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The dissent appears correct in asserting that the majority underemphasizes
the child's best interests. The majority balances Meyers' interests against the
Floyds' without discussing what is best for Michael.
A case decided four days after Hopkins, Greenville County Department
of Social Services v. Bowes,4" illustrates another difference in judicial
philosophy between the two supreme court camps. In Bowes the South
Carolina Supreme Court reversed the family court's decision terminating a
mother's parental rights and remanded for a custody determination. The court
found that DSS and the child's foster parents failed to prove by clear and
convincing evidence that the severity or repetition of abuse or neglect made
it reasonably unlikely that the mother could make the home safe within twelve
months.49
The Bowes majority, comprised of Justices Moore, Chandler, and
Finney,5" based its reversal on four factors. First, the only evidence of abuse
was the removal order finding physical abuse based on one February 1991
incident. The abuse finding in this removal order required proof by a
preponderance of the evidence and therefore was an insufficient finding of
harm to support termination under a clear and convincing standard."1
Second, the family court failed to determine the severity of abuse, simply
relying on evidence of the single incident which involved minor bruises.
"While such physical abuse may constitute ground for removal of the child,
it does not rise to the level of abuse required for termination.'52
Third, no finding exists for a court to conclude that the abuse was
repetitive. Again, the court based its decision only upon the single incident
in February 1991."3
Finally, DSS and. the foster parents failed to prove by clear and
convincing evidence that it was not reasonably likely that the mother could
make the home safe within twelve months. Instead, a DSS worker testified
that the mother had done everything requested of her and that the mother still
complied with the DSS treatment plan.54
In Bowes, the dissent described at length the "national scandal" of "[t]he
prevalence and severity of child abuse and neglect in the United States. " "
The dissent saw this case as an example of the problems inherent in the family
court system:
48. _ S.C. _, 437 S.E.2d 107 (1993).
49. See id. at, 437 S.E.2d at 111; S.C. CoDE ANN. § 20-7-1572(1) (Law. Co-op. 1976).
50. Bowes, _ S.C. at _, 437 S.E.2d at 108, 111.
51. Id. at _, 437 S.E.2d at 110 (citing South Carolina Dep't of Social Servs. v. Martell,
279 S.C. 289, 307 S.E.2d 601 (1983)).
52. Id. at_, 437 S.E.2d at 110.
53. Id. at _, 437 S.E.2d at 110.
54. Id. at_, 437 S.E.2d at 110.
55. Bowes, _ S.C. at _, 437 S.E.2d at 113 (oal, I., dissenting).
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The disintegration of the American family has as great an impact on rising
violent crime in this country as any single factor. All too often, children
who are victims of abuse and neglect grow up to become the violent and
dysfunctional in society. The court system rightly is criticized for failing
to intervene quickly and effectively in abuse and neglect cases. This case
is a perfect example of a child "caught in a system" of procedural
delays. 5
6
As in Hopkins, the dissent espoused a liberal construction of parental
termination statutes to effectuate the separation of children from natural
parents to serve the child's best interests. The dissent differs with the majority
as to the proper interpretation of Santosky v. Kramer. In Santosky the
Supreme Court held that a parent's unfitness must be proved by at least clear
and convincing evidence before a court can terminate parental rights.58
While the majority determined that Santosky requires clear and convincing
evidence of harm under section 20-7-1572(l),'5 the dissent stated that
Santosky requires clear and convincing evidence of the severity or repetition
of the abuse or neglect.' Apparently, the dissent would allow unproven
abuse complaints to serve as evidence of abuse.
The dissent's reasoning is problematic because it separates the finding of
abuse and the finding of the severity or repetition of abuse. If Santosky carries
any meaning, Santosky must require proof by clear and convincing evidence
that abuse occurred. If this requirement can be circumvented by allowing a
lower proof standard that the abuse occurred while maintaining the semblance
of a clear and convincing standard for proof of severity or repetition, the
"fundamentally fair procedures" 61 required by Santosky would not be
provided. Clear and convincing proof of severity or repetition is meaningless
without clear and convincing proof of abuse.
This case presents another example of the dissent's effort to interpret
statutory requirements in a way that effectuates its view of the child's best
interest. The dissent hopes to counter "this country's biological bias" that
protects parents "to the utmost extent" while ignoring the child's best
interests.6' While applaudable, the dissent cannot ignore legitimate statutory
56. Id. at_, 437 S.E.2d at 113 (Toal, J., dissenting).
57. 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
58. ld. at 747-48.
59. Bowes, _ S.C. __, 437 S.E.2d at 111.
60. Id. at__, 437 S.E.2d at 114-15.
61. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753-54.
62. Bowes, _ S.C. at_, 437 S.E.2d at 114 (Toal, J., dissenting) (citing Charles D. Gill,
Essay on the Status of the American Child, 2000 A.D.: Chattell or Constitutionally Protected
Child-Citizens?, 17 Ohio N.U.L. REv. 543 (1991)).
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grounds and constitutionally required levels of proof in pursuit of its goals.
The law must protect the parent as well as the child.
The split within the court leaves the law and the Hopkins case itself
unsettled. In Hopkins the lower court did not grant a custody change, but
found that the child should continue to reside with the foster parents pending
the development of a close relationship with his father. If that relationship is
established, custody might change.
Furthermore, the court itself is changing. Chief Justice Harwell retired
this year, and Justice Chandler also will retire this year. If new Associate
Justice John Waller, sworn in June 29, 1994, and whomever the South
Carolina Legislature elects to replace Chandler, agree with Justice Toal's
position, the weight of authority may switch again.
For now, a split of opinion exists within the supreme court as to the
difficulty of granting termination of parental rights and as to custody disputes
between a natural parent and a third party. The current majority will uphold
parental rights absent clear and convincing evidence of statutory grounds for
termination. The minority would not uphold those rights when termination of
a natural parent's rights would serve the child's best interests. Similarly, the
majority requires a much greater showing of fault of the natural parent to
warrant granting custody to a third party while the dissent would grant a third
party custody, regardless of parental fault, to serve the child's best interest.
This represents a different view of statutory construction and a different view
of the court's role in protecting the welfare of children and the rights of
parents.
Allyson Haynes
III. COURT CALLS INTO QUESTION EMANCIPATED
CHILD'S DUTY TO MITIGATE EDUCATION EXPENSES
The South Carolina Supreme Court's holding in McDuffie v. McDuffie'
may foreshadow a new era in South Carolina domestic relations law.
Considering a divorced father's obligation to support his emancipated child
enrolled in college, the supreme court reversed in part, yet affirmed in result,
the court of appeals' holding.2 The supreme court reasoned that the court of
appeals improperly relied on Risinger v. RisingeP rather than court-mandated
support obligations in resolving a contract construction question.4 Perhaps
more significantly, the supreme court announced, "[W]e have never held that
1. _ S.C. __, 438 S.E.2d 239 (1993), rev'g in part and aff'g in result 308 S.C. 401, 418
S.E.2d 331 (Ct. App. 1992) (per curiam).
2. See id. at__, 438 S.E.2d at 241.
3. 273 S.C. 36, 253 S.E.2d 652 (1979).
4. See McDuffie, _ S.C. at _, 438 S.E.2d at 241.
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there is a duty under Risinger for a child to minimize college expenses. "I If
this announcement is more than a casual observation, South Carolina is poised
to enter a new era in domestic relations law.
Donna R. McDuffie (Mother) and E.F. McDuffie, Sr. (Father)6 married
in 1965. They had two daughters, Nina and Missy. Mother and Father
divorced in 1978. 7 Their divorce decree required Father "to be solely
responsible for the expense of [Nina and Missy's] college education ....
[and] to pay all expenses associated with such college education . . even
though [Nina or Missy] has attained ... her majority. "I The older daughter,
Nina, entered college in 1985 and Missy enrolled in 1989.1
In 1990 Mother, Nina, and Missy filed suit against Father seeking
reimbursement for the daughters' college expenses.'" The family court
ordered Father to reimburse Nina for expenses incurred during her five years
of college. Additionally, that court ordered Father to pay Missy's "future
tuition and fees, room and board, transportation and book costs, and 'other
incidental costs and expenses' and to pay her $400 per month as long as she
makes at least a 2.0 ('C') grade point average.""
The court of appeals reversed Nina's award for reimbursement of her
educational expenses.' Furthermore, that court held that Father was not
obligated to pay Missy's transportation expenses, incidental expenses, or $400
per month spending money because the separation agreement did not include
these expenses"3 and because Missy failed to "fulfill her duty to help
5. Id. at _ n.4, 438 S.E.2d at 241 n.4.
6. Father died in April 1992. Father's personal representatives substituted as litigants. Id.
at n.1, 438 S.E.2d at 240 n.1.
7. Id. at _,438 S.E.2d at 240.
8. Id. at __, 438 S.E.2d at 240 (emphasis added).
9. McDuffie, _ S.C. at _, 438 S.E.2d at 240.'
10. Id. at _, 438 S.E.2d at 240.
11. McDuffie v. McDuffie, 308 S.C. 401, 404, 418 S.E.2d 331, 333 (Ct.App. 1992) (per
curian), rev'd in part and aff'd in result, _ S.C. _, 438 S.E.2d 239 (1993).
12. See id. at 407, 418 S.E.2d at 335. The court of appeals reasoned that Nina was unentitled
to reimbursement because "[Nina] did not pay any of her college expenses." Id. at 406, 418
S.E.2d at 335. However, the court did determine that Mother was entitled to reimbursement for
"those amounts spent on [Nina's] college expenses according to the terms of the divorce decree."
Id. at 406-07, 418 S.E.2d at 335 The court remanded for determination of the amount. See id.
at 407, 418 S.E.2d at 335. On this issue, the supreme court affirmed, not concerning itself with
Nina's expenses in rendering its opinion. See McDuffie, - S.C. at __ n.2, 438 S.E.2d 240
n.2. Therefore, this article will not focus on Father's obligations toward Nina.
13. The court of appeals determined that the separation agreement's terms were ambiguous
and concluded that the parties intended the term "college expenses" to exclude transportation
expenses, incidental expenses, and spending money. See McDuffie, 308 S.C. at 404-05, 418
S.E.2d at 334 (citing Mattox v. Cassady, 289 S.C. 57, 344 S.E.2d 620 (Ct. App. 1986)).
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minimize college expenses." 14 Hence, the court of appeals held that Father
was obligated to pay only "for [Missy's] education according to the terms of
the divorce decree."15
The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals' result
in McDuffie, yet reversed the determination that Missy had a duty to minimize
her college expenses. 16 The supreme court reasoned that Father's support
obligations for Missy's education hinged on the separation agreement's term
"all college expenses" rather than on the court's determination of expenses.
Therefore, the supreme court viewed the dispute differently than had the court
of appeals and did not apply Risinger. Relying on Stanaland v. Jamison,17
the supreme court determined that Father's support obligation was contractual,
and a court could not modify without the parties' consent.18 Because the
separation agreement did not obligate Father to pay the other expenses, Father
had no obligation to make these payments. Likewise, the separation agreement
did not obligate Missy to minimize college expenses. Therefore, the court of
appeals erred in determining that Missy had a duty to minimize these
expenses. 19
McDuffie is hardly novel in South Carolina domestic relations law.
Applying firmly settled principles of law, McDuffie clearly announces that in
interpreting parental support obligations under a separation agreement, courts
should rely solely upon the parents' expressed and understood meaning of the
separation agreement. Only when the agreement does not adequately address
educational support for an emancipated child should the courts apply Risinger.
Perhaps the most significant aspect of McDuffle is the supreme court's
dicta in footnote four of its opinion. The court wrote, "Although this Court
has recognized, as factors [in determining the support obligations of the
divorced parent of an emancipated child], the availability of grants and the
ability of a child to earn income, we have never held that there is a duty under
Risinger for a child to minimize college expenses." 20 Although relegated to
a footnote, this comment clearly conflicts with several recent court of appeals
Father's attorney asked Mother at trial, "'[A]II you're asking for is room, board, and tuition and
books?'" Mother replied, "'I think that's fair.'" Id. at 405, 418 S.E.2d at 334.
14. McDuffie, 308 S.C. at 405, 418 S.E.2d at 334. The court of appeals cited Kirsch v.
Kirsch, 299 S.C. 201, 383 S.E.2d 254 (Ct. App. 1989), for the propositionthat an emancipated
child receiving educational assistance from a divorced parent has a duty to minimize expenses.
See McDuffie, 308 S.C. at 405, 418 S.E.2d at 334.
15. McDuffie, 308 S.C. at 406, 418 S.E.2d at 335.
16. See McDuffie, _ S.C. at _, 438 S.E.2d at 241.
17. 275 S.C. 50, 268 S.E.2d 578 (1980).
18. See McDuffie, _ S.C. at _, 438 S.E.2d at 241.
19. Id. at __,438 S.E.2d at 241.
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decisions requiring emancipated children of divorced parents to minimize their
educational expenses. It is unclear whether the supreme court intended to
change the law's course or merely offered the dicta as a casual observance.
Interpreting the language of section 14-21-810(b) (4) of the South Carolina
Code,21 Risinger announced for the first time that a child's educational needs
were "'exceptional circumstance[s]'" that might compel an order of parental
support for a child beyond the age of eighteen.' In that opinion, the
supreme court held:
[A] family court judge may require a parent to contribute ...money
necessary to enable a child over 18 to attend ... school. . . where...
there is evidence that: (1) the characteristics of the child indicate that he
or she will benefit from college; (2) the child demonstrates the ability to
do well, or at least make satisfactory grades; (3) the child cannot otherwise
go to school; and (4) the parent has the financial ability to help pay for
such an education.23
The supreme court consistently has applied this four-part test since its first
articulation.24
Focusing on whether a child could attend school without parental support,
the supreme court considered factors such as whether the child has minimized
expenses by working, taking loans, and living at home," as well as whether
the child has received tuition grants.26 While the supreme court considers
these factors important, that court has never declared expressly that a child
must pursue these avenues before the court will deem the child's education an
exceptional circumstance.
The court of appeals also has applied the Risinger test.27 However,
21. S.C. CODE ANN. § 14-21-810(b) (4) (Law. Co-op. 1977) (current version at S.C. CODE
ANN. § 20-7-420(17) (Law. Co-op. 1985)).
22. Risingerv. Risinger, 273 S.C. 36, 38, 253 S.E.2d 652, 653 (1979).
23. Id. at 39, 253 S.E.2d at 653-54.
24. See, e.g., Bull, 299 S.C. at 125-26, 382 S.E.2d at 906-07 (remanding the case to
determine whether the factors necessitated support and rejecting a mere change in circumstances
test); Dunnavantv. Dunnavant, 278 S.C. 445, 446-47,298 S.E.2d 442, 443 (1982) (per curiam)
(reversing an ex parte order to terminate school assistance for a nineteen year old and remanding
to determine whether the presence of the Risinger factors require continued support); Kerr v.
Kerr, 278 S.C. 191, 193-94, 293 S.E.2d 704, 705-06 (1982) (affirming an award of assistance
to an emancipated child who fulfilled the Risinger requirements).
25. E.g., Risinger, 273 S.C. at 37, 253 S.E.2d at 653.
26. E.g., Kerr, 278 S.C. at 193, 293 S.E.2d at 706.
27. See McDuffiev. McDuffie, 308 S.C. 401,405,418 S.E.2d 331, 334 (Ct.App. 1992) (per
curiam), rev'd in part and aff'd in result, _ S.C. _, 438 S.E.2d 239 (1993); Kelly v. Kelly,
- S.C. _, 423 S.E.2d 153, 154 (Ct. App. 1992) (discussing the Risinger factors in denying
an award of educational support to an emancipated child); Kirsch v. Kirsch, 299 S.C. 201, 205,
383 S.E.2d 254, 256 (Ct. App. 1989); Wagner v. Wagner, 285 S.C. 430, 431, 329 S.E.2d 788,
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since Risinger, the court of appeals gradually has developed its own interpreta-
tion of the Risinger test. The court of appeals' interpretation places a greater
onus on the child than does the supreme court's version by holding that an
emancipated child seeking parental support has an absolute duty to minimize
expenses.
The court of appeals began to develop its interpretation in Hughes v.
Hughes.2" The issue before the court of appeals was whether a divorced
father was required to support his eighteen-year-old daughter attending college.
In deciding that the father was obligated, the court of appeals considered "the
availability of grants and loans and the ability of a child to earn income during
the school year or on vacation."29 Drawing an analogy to Risinger, that
court found that "these factors [are] relevant because an emancipated child has
a duty to help minimize college expenses when a parent's financial support for
these expenses is sought through the family courts. 30
The court of appeals' decision in McKinney v. McKinney3 did not
expressly hold that a child seeking educational support has a duty to minimize
expenses, but remanded the case for a determination of whether "Mr.
McKinney [could] put Michael through college ... [and] whether Michael
could otherwise attend college without his father's support."32 Notably, the
child seeking support in McKinney was a minor.33 Although the court of
appeals did not articulate a distinction between McKinney and Hughes (in
which the child was emancipated), it is possible that the court of appeals has
determined that a child has an affirmative duty to minimize educational
expenses only when the child has attained majority. However, the court
categorized education expenses as an exigent circumstance warranting support
after a child reaches majority.34 Thus, it is possible that the court was
providing for the child's future educational expenses and did not reach the
issue of whether the child had a duty to minimize.
The court of appeals' interpretation of Risinger continued to evolve in
Wagner v. Wagner.35 In Wagner an eighteen-year-old son sued his father for
support and maintenance for education expenses. The family court ordered the
father to pay two hundred dollars per month in educational support. On
appeal the court remanded the case for a determination of "whether the son
789 (Ct. App. 1985); Hughes v. Hughes, 280 S.C. 388, 391, 313 S.E.2d 32, 33 (Ct. App.
1984).
28. 280 S.C. 388, 313 S.E.2d 32 (Ct. App. 1984) (per curiam).
29. Id. at 391, 313 S.E.2d at 33 (citing Newburgh v. Arrigo, 443 A.2d 1031 (N.J. 1982)).
30. Id. at 391, 313 S.E.2d at 33-34.
31. 282 S.C. 96, 316 S.E.2d 728 (Ct. App. 1984).
32. Id. at 99, 316 S.E.2d at 730.
33. See id. at 97-98, 316 S.E.2d at 729.
34. Id. at 99, 316 S.E.2d at 730.
35. 285 S.C. 430, 329 S.E.2d 788 (Ct. App. 1985).
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intented [sic] to contribute to his own education."3" The court then stated,
"While we hold the evidence sustains the trial judge's findings of fact about
the four factors specifically mentioned in Risinger, we remand for consider-
ation of the two factors . . . set forth from Hughes."37 The Hughes factors
articulated by the court were: "(1) the availability of grants and loans and (2)
the ability of the child to earn income during the school year or on vaca-
tion. "38
In his dissent Judge Goolsby went even further, stating that the court
should not require the father to make any support payments to his son because
the son chose to play college football rather than work. Judge Goolsby
chided, "I know of no principle of law that requires a divorced parent to help
an able-bodied adult child who will not help himself. . . . In my view,
Risinger should apply only where there is a true hardship.""
The supreme court has not reviewed the court of appeals' determination
that an emancipated child seeking parental educational support under Risinger
has a duty to minimize college expenses. Nonetheless, in McDuffie, the
supreme court incorporated into its opinion a footnote not bearing on the
outcome of the case, but unequivocally announcing that "we have never held
that there is a duty under Risinger for a child to minimize college expens-
es. "4 The dicta's significance is difficult to determine.
If the supreme court wanted to reverse the court of appeals' "duty to
minimize" standard, the supreme court could have reviewed Hughes, Wagner,
or one of the cases following Risinger.4 1 That the supreme court did not
review these cases may well indicate that the supreme court tacitly, if not
expressly, agrees with the court of appeals' duty to minimize standard. On the
other hand, the supreme court's failure to review may simply indicate that
none of the litigants sought review. Perhaps the supreme court's dicta in
McDuffle invites would-be litigants, the court hinting that its interpretation of
Risinger differs from that of the court of appeals.
From the text of McDuffie it is virtually impossible to discern whether the
supreme court seeks to guide the law back toward Risinger. That court's dicta
in footnote four may represent nothing more than an interesting (and
36. Id. at 432, 329 S.E.2d at 789.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 431-32, 329 S.E.2d at 789.
39. Id. at 434, 329 S.E.2d at 790 (Goolsby, J., dissenting).
40. McDuffie, _ S.C. at _ n.4, 438 S.E.2d at 241 n.4.
41. Hughes and Wagner are the leading cases in which the court of appeals held that a child
has a duty to minimize expenses. McDuffie and Kirsch have similar holdings. See also Nicholson
v. Lewis, 295 S.C. 434, 438, 369 S.E.2d 649, 650-51 (Ct. App. 1988) (finding that the daughter
made an effort to minimize expenses and affirming the trial judge's order that her father
contribute to her educational expenses).
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interested) observation. However, the supreme court's dicta in footnote four
may forecast a significant change in the law.
Although the phrasing and location of the dicta in McDuffie may not
provide a litigant with much ammunition at the trial level, litigants certainly
should consider it when fashioning an appeal.
W Keith Martens
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